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MAXIMIZING THE FUTURE: THE CASE FOR MANDATING FRAUD PREVENTION TOOLS IN
ELECTRONIC HEALTH RECORD SOFTWARE

RYAN POTENTE1
INTRODUCTION
For decades, the U.S. health care system has been plagued by inefficiencies that have
contributed to the rising cost of health care.2 In 2011, the federal government spent an
astounding $2.7 trillion dollars on health care.3 To put this figure in proper perspective,
consider that, excluding the United States, only four countries in the entire world have a
GDP that exceeds $2.7 trillion.4 In an effort to curb health care spending, and also
promote better quality of care, the United States has made the move towards electronic
health records (hereinafter “EHRs”).5 There is little doubt that EHRs represent the future
of health care in the United States, but if that future is going to be bright, the federal
government has to ensure that EHR systems do exacerbate the problem of health care
fraud. 6

1

Seton Hall University School of Law, J.D. Candidate 2013.
According to the World Health Organization (WHO), the U.S. spent more on health care per
capita, $7,146, and more on health care as percentage of its GDP, 15.2%, than any other nation in
2008. World Health Organization, World Health Statistics: 2011, http://www.who.int/gho/
publications/world_health_statistics/EN_WHS2011_Full.pdf
3
See Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services, National Health Expenditure Projections
2011-2021, https://www.cms.gov/Research-Statistics-Data-and-Systems/Statistics-Trends-andReports/NationalHealthExpendData/Downloads/Proj2011PDF.pdf.
4
Trading Economics, Gross Domestic Product (GDP), List by Country,
http://www.tradingeconomics.com/gdp-list-by-country.
5
The American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009 (Recovery Act) authorizes the Centers
for Medicare and Medicaid Services (CMS) to award incentive payments for health care
professionals who demonstrate ‘meaningful use’ of ‘certified’ EHR systems. In 2015, financial
penalties are schedule to take effect for Medicare and Medicaid providers who do not transition to
EHRs. See 42 C.F.R. 495.6l; 42 C.F.R 495; 42 C.F.R 102.
6
Healthcare fraud is defined generally as an “intentional deception or misrepresentation that the
individual or entity makes knowing that the misrepresentation could result in some unauthorized
benefit to the individual, or the entity or to some other party.” National Health Care Anti-fraud
Association. What is Healthcare Fraud?,
www.nhcaa.org/about_health_care_fraud/Consumer_Information
2
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EHR systems include certain timesaving software tools, such as copy and paste
functions, that increase the efficiency of health care delivery. However, these very same
software tools can be also be used to commit fraud faster and with greater ease than ever
before.7 Unfortunately, the federal government and ONC8 have largely ignored this
vexing issue.9 This point is perhaps most apparent after consideration of the “certification
regulations,” which were adopted by the ONC in 2010 and set forth the required
minimum capabilities of an EHR system. Despite setting forth extensive functional
requirements, there is not even one provision in the regulations that is specifically
designed to prevent fraud.10 This paper will argue that, in order to avoid an increase in
health care fraud, the certification regulations must be amended to include functional
7

See generally Lisa Eramo. Stopping Fraud: Detecting and Preventing Fraud in the e-Health Era.
Journal of AHIMA, March 2011, American Health Information Management Association,
http://library.ahima.org/xpedio/groups/public/documents/ahima/bok1_048698.hcsp?dDocName=
bok1_048698.
8
The ONC, Office of the National Coordinator for Health Information Technology, is
organizationally located within the Office of HHS and “is the principal Federal entity charged
with coordination of nationwide efforts to implement and use the most advanced health
information technology and the electronic exchange of health information.” About ONC: The
Office
of
the
National
Coordinator,
HealthIT,
May
5,
2012,http://healthit.hhs.gov/portal/server.pt/community/healthit_hhs_gov__onc/1200.
9
Since 2009, the Obama Administration has held dozens of public meetings on electronic health
record policies and standards, but none that focused primarily on fraud control. Fred Schulte,
Billing Software Helps Medical Professionals Document Higher Fees, The Center for Public
Integrity, September 19, 2012, http://www.publicintegrity.org/2012/09/19/10812/growthelectronic-medical-records-eases-path-inflated-bills. See also Donald Simborg, There is No
Neutral Position on Fraud, Journal of the American Informatics Association, July, 2011
(discussing specific examples of how the leadership at the ONC has chosen not to be proactive
with regard to fraud management.)
10
“To date, federal meaningful use requirements do not include a fraud prevention component,
and EHR certification related to the program thus does not require it.” Id. See also 45 C.F.R
170.302, 304,306 and 314 (hereinafter “the certification regulations provisions.”) It is important
to note that the certification regulations do contain some provisions that are helpful towards
deterring fraud. For example, 45 C.F.R. 170.302(o) requires each EHR system to “assign a
unique name/and or tracking number for identifying and tracking user identity.” However,
anything in the regulations helpful to preventing fraud is “limited to those which overlap with
security and privacy concerns which motivated their inclusion.” Simborg, supra note 9. This
paper takes the position that the certification regulations must include provisions that are
specifically tailored to the unique threats of fraud created by the use of EHR software tools in
order to avoid an increase in health care fraud.

2

requirements that are specifically tailored to address the unique fraud threats caused by
EHR systems (these functional requirements will hereinafter be referred to as “fraud
prevention software tools.” )
This paper is organized as follows: Part I discusses how EHR software can be
used to increase the ease and speed of committing health care fraud, and presents data
that suggests fraud has already increased as a result of unprotected EHR systems.11 Part II
sets forth four policy reasons why this problem should be addressed in the certification
regulations with fraud prevention software tools. Part III recommends specifics fraud
prevention tools that should be included in the certification regulations. Finally, Part IV
concludes this paper by addressing some likely criticisms to use of fraud software tools.
I.

UNSECURED EHR SYSTEMS INCREASE
HEALTH CARE FRAUD

THE

EASE & SPEED

OF

COMMITTING

In a recent New York Times article, Dr. David J. Brailer, former National
Coordinator of the ONC, stated unequivocally the use of EHRs “makes it faster and
easier to be fraudulent.”12 Dr. Brailer’s sentiment is hardly ground breaking. In fact, two
separate reports commissioned by the federal government have reached the same
conclusion.13 EHR systems increase the ease and speed of committing health care fraud
primarily because they include software tools that make it exceedingly easy to create a
Healthcare fraud is defined as an “intentional deception or misrepresentation that the individual
or entity makes knowing that the misrepresentation could result in some unauthorized benefit to
the individual, or the entity or to some other party.” National Health Care Anti-fraud Association.
What is Healthcare Fraud?, www.nhcaa.org/about_health_care_fraud/Consumer_Information.
12
Reed Albeson, Medicare Bills Rise as Records Turn Electronics, N.Y. Times, Sept. 21 2012.
13
“Without a deliberate effort to build fraud management into [electronic systems], healthcare
payers and consumers will be exposed to new and potentially increased vulnerability to
electronically enabled healthcare fraud.” Foundation of Research and Education of AHIMA,
Report on the Use of Health Information Technology to Enhance and Expand Health Care AntiFraud Activities, 13, September 30, 2005. See also, discussed extensively in Part III, RTI
International, Recommended Requirements for Enhancing Data Quality in Electronic Health
Records, May 2007, http://www.rti.org/pubs/enhancing_data_quality_in_ehrs.pdf.
11
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false record of what occurred during a medical encounter. Most commonly, the false
record will be used to deliberately ‘bill for a service not rendered’ or provide the basis for
‘upcoding.’14 These schemes already represent the two most popular forms of health care
fraud15, and as such, any increase in their occurrence through the exploitation of EHR
software is a grave concern.
A few of the most frequently abused EHR tools include: (i) one-click notes, (ii) copy
and paste features, and (iii) billing decision message prompts (hereinafter “message
prompts.) Although one-click notes and copy and paste features function differently, they
largely present the same problem in that they both increase the speed and ease of
inserting false information into a medical record. One-click notes, as the name suggests,

‘Billing for services not rendered’ is a scheme wherein a bill is deliberately submitted for
payment even though no medical service was actually provided. ‘Upcoding,’ in contrast, is a
scheme wherein the health care providers submits a bill using a procedure code that yields a
higher payment than the code for the service that was truly rendered. Federal Bureau of
Investigation, Financial Crimes Report to the Public: 2010-2011, http://www.fbi.gov/statsservices/publications/financial-crimes-report-2010-2011. It is important to distinguish these two
schemes, which are committed deliberately, with inadvertent errors in coding for which,
according to the Wall Street Journal, “there are no comprehensive statistics.” Jessica SilverGreenberg, How to Fight a Bogus Bill, The Wall Street Journal, February 18, 2011. The paper’s
focus is on those whom deliberately abuse EHR software tools to commit healthcare fraud faster
and with greater ease.
15 The specific percentage of fraud attributable to these activities vary from study to study, but all
indicate upcoding and billing for services not rendered account for the majority of health care
fraud. Foundation of Research and Education of AHIMA, Automated Coding Software:
Development and Use to Enhance Anti-Fraud Activities, July, 2005, Page 8.
http://library.ahima.org/xpedio/groups/public/documents/ahima/bok1_031700.pdf
(hereinafter
“AHIMA coding report.”) The AHIMA coding report concluded these schemes account for 77%
of fraud, 43% for upcoding and 34% for billing for services not rendered. Id. In contrast,
DataWatch, utilizing data from public and private payers, determined these schemes accounted
for 56% of fraud, 22% for upcoding and 34% for billing for services not rendered. Datawatch,
Health Insurance Fraud Busters, Business and Health, 2000, pg. 18.
14

4

allow physicians to paste a pre-programmed examination note with just one-click.16 For
example, some systems allow the following to be entered into an EHR with just oneclick: “[t]he chest expansion is normal and symmetrical. There is no dullness to
percussion. Both diaphragms move adequately. There are no rales, rhonchi, wheezes,
egophony nor whispered pectoriloquy.”17 Some systems go even further, and allow
physicians to create longer and more detailed notes that could cover extremely intricate
examinations.18
Whereas one-click notes are typically limited to certain common procedures, the
potential for abuse of copy and paste features is almost limitless. A common scheme
involves pasting the same examination findings for multiple patients, a practice known as
cloning.19 However, cut and paste features can be abused even more subtlety when it is
limited to the same patient’s record. For example, consider a situation where a patient is
hospitalized with an infection and the standard of care requires the patient be examined
thoroughly each day to gauge the progress of treatment. By using the copy and paste
feature, a physician can make it appear that the initial examination, which may have been
very thorough and therefore entitled to a high billing code, was completed every day.
However, in actuality, a much shorter examination was most likely completed after the
initial examination. Anecdotal evidence suggests this type of fraud is exceedingly

16

Daniel Essin, The Ethical Dilemma Created by EHRs, Physicians Practice, June 18, 2012,
http://www.physicianspractice.com/blog/content/article/1462168/2083374
17
Donald Simborg, Promoting Electronic Health Record Adoption: Is It the Correct Focus?,
Journal
of
the
American
Medical
Informatics
Association,
2008,
http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC2274790.
18
Id. For example, Medical Training Billing Corp. (MTBC), a web-based EHR company, offers
an EHR system, ChartsProTM, that includes one-click notes that encompass entire exams “for
musculoskeletal, vascular, and lymphatic systems.” Medical Training Billing Corp., EHR
Features, 2012, http://www.mtbc.com/ehr-features.aspx.
19
Albeson, supra note 12.

5

common. For example, Robert E. Hirschtick, M.D., Associate Professor at Northwestern
Medical School, noted that after EHR software was adopted at Northwestern “virtually
all of [the examination] notes are longer, recombinant versions of previous notes…
Ideally, old information and diagnostic impressions are deleted and new ones added. In
reality, however, there is no deletion, only additions.” 20
Message prompts also contribute to the creation of false documentation in EHRs, but
in a very different way than one-click notes or cut and paste features. In general, message
prompts help physicians select the medical billing code that corresponds with the service
provided and, in turn, determines the amount of reimbursement.21 While coding
assistance is fine in and of itself, many prompts go too far and actively increase the ease
of committing health care fraud by specifically advising physicians what documentation
is required to justify higher billing codes.22 Typically, message prompts notify the
physician if the billing code he or she entered is not justified by the current EHR
documentation, and then advises how to reach the higher code.

20

23

However, some EHR

Robert Hirschtick, Copy and Paste, JAMA, 2006,
http://courses.washington.edu/hmed665i/copyandpaste.pdf
21
Rich Henriksen, Healthcare Coding, Billing & Reimbursement Overview, Healthcare
Consulting, http://minneanalytics.org/files/Rich_Henriksen.pdf.
22 While it could be argued that prompts do not increase the ease of committing fraud, since
physicians intuitively know documentation for a more serious diagnosis carries a higher
reimbursement, it should be emphasized that the delineations between billing codes can be
extremely minute and are notoriously difficult to understand. There are currently 17,000 different
diagnosis codes and that number will increase to 144,000 when the ICD-10 billing requirements
take effect on October 1, 2014. Jennifer Bresnick, Q&A: ICD-10 Progress With Pat Schmitter,
EHRIntelligence, November 7, 2012, http://ehrintelligence.com/2012/11/07/qa-icd-10-progresswith-pat-schmitter. The use of prompts after that time will be extremely important to all
physicians, whether they desire to upcode or not, since “ICD-10 will inherently bring to need for
more specific documentation.” Lee Ford, Coding & Clinical Documentation Challenges of ICD10, North Carolina Health Information Management Assoc., June 24, 2010,
www.nchima.org/smart05-bin/public/downloadlibrary?&itemid2307.
23
Mildred L. Johnson, Electronic Medical Records Playbook, Texas Tech University Health
Science Center Office of Billing Compliance, June 5, 2008, http://www.ttuhsc.edu/elpaso/it/
documents/EMR_Playbook.pdf.

6

systems go even further and indicate how to reach higher codes even when the initial
code entered by the physician was justified by the EHR documentation. 24
Recent data suggests the potentialities of fraud discussed above have been realized in
the areas of the country that have already adopted EHR systems. In September of 2012,
the New York Times conducted a data analysis of Medicare claims that revealed
hospitals with EHR systems are increasing their use of the highest billing codes.25 A
particularly egregious example is Baptist Hospital in Nashville, Tennessee which
submitted 82% of its claims at the highest level in the year after it adopted an EHR
system. 26 Over all, hospitals that received government incentives to adopt EHRs showed
a 47% rise in Medicare payments at higher levels from 2006 to 2010, compared to just a
32% rise in hospitals that have not received government incentives.27 The Times’
findings were confirmed by the Center of Public Integrity (CPI) which conducted a
similar data analysis of claims from 2001 to 2010.

28

The CPI found, “thousands of

providers turned to more expensive billing codes…despite little evidence that Medicare
patients as a whole are older or sicker than in past years.”29 While no one cause could be
identified, CPI concluded, “higher billing rates appear to be associated with the use of

24

Id. Farzad Mostashari, the current National Coordinator for ONC, has recognized that prompts
that suggest more documentation to reach a higher billing code “might be over the line.” Robert
Lowes, Federal EHR Office to Look at Overbilling Allegations, Medscape Medical News,
October 19, 2012, http://www.medscape.com/viewarticle/772944.
25
Albeson, supra note 12.
26
Id.
27
Id.
28
Fred Schulte, Center Investigation Suggests Costs From Upcoding and Other Abuses Likely
Top $11 Billion, Center for Public Integrity, September 15, 2012, http://publicintegrity.org/2012
/09/15/10810/how-doctors-and-hospitals-have-collected-billions-questionable-medicare-fees.
29
Id.
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medical records and billing software... which make it easy to create detailed patient files
with just a few mouse clicks.”30
While the initial data is admittedly limited, it has gotten the attention of the federal
government. In a letter dated September 24, 2012, the Secretary of HHS Kathleen
Sebelius and U.S. Attorney General Eric Holder advised the chief executive officers of
five leading hospital associations that there are "troubling indications" that some
providers are using EHRs to "game the system." 31 The letter reiterated the government’s
commitment to catching fraudsters noting, “law enforcement will take appropriate steps
to pursue health care providers who misused electronic health records.”32 While the letter
serves as a strong warning, immediate federal action is required if the government hopes
to slow down fraud attributable to EHRs. For the policy reasons set forth in Part II,
below, federal action should take the form of amending the certification regulations to
require all EHR systems include fraud prevention software tools.
II.

POLICY ARGUMENTS THAT SUPPORT AMENDING THE CERTIFICATION
REGULATIONS TO REQUIRE FRAUD PREVENTION TOOLS IN EHRS

Before setting forth the policy reasons why the certification regulations should be
amended, it is important to note that there is little doubt that the ONC has the statutory
authority to make the changes this paper will advocate. Under 42 U.S.C.A 300jj-11(c)(5),
the ONC is given the responsibility to “keep or recognize a program for the voluntary
certification of health information technology.”33 Moreover, the ONC is given broad

30

Id.
Letter from Obama Administration on Billing, September 24, 2012, http://www.nytimes.com/
/interactive/2012/09/25/business/25medicare-doc.html?ref=business.
32 Id.
33
The HHS news release announcing that the ONC had issued a final rule for EHR certification
explicitly cites to this statutory section. “This final rule is issued under the authority provided to
31

8

discretion in determining the underlying certification criteria under 42 U.S.C.A. 300jj14(b)(3) which states the ONC “shall adopt…implementation specifications and
certification criteria as necessary.” Further, ONC leadership has previously recognized,
through its words and official actions, that it has the ability to mandate fraud prevention
tools in EHR systems. 34
There are at least four policy arguments that support amending the federal
certification regulations to mandate the inclusion of fraud prevention tools in EHRs. First,
given the tremendous negative impact of fraud and abuse on the U.S health care system, a
strong federal response is required to prevent further damage from the exploitation of
EHR software. Second, the responsive tactics currently emphasized by the government
are of limited effectiveness in combating health care fraud, and as such, more emphasis
must be placed on proactive fraud prevention tactics like EHR fraud prevention tools.
Third, data mining, the government’s primary proactive fraud prevention approach,
cannot slow significantly slow down the increased fraud due to use of EHR software
tools, and therefore, should be supplemented with more and diversified proactive
approaches. Fourth, and finally, fraud prevention tools should be included in all EHRs
the National Coordinator for Health Information Technology in section 3001(c)(5) of the Public
Health Service Act (PHSA) as added by the HITECH Act.” HHS, ONC Issues Final Rule to
Establish Certification Program for Electronic Health Record Technology, June 18, 2010,
http://www.hhs.gov/news/press/2010pres/06/20100618d.html.
34
Dr. Simborg notes that shortly after the creation of the ONC it’s first National Coordinator, Dr.
David Brailer, convened a panel of health law experts and posed to them the question, should the
ONC “be neutral with regard to fraud or proactive in combating fraud?” See Simborg, supra note
9. Further, the ONC subsequently commissioned a report prepared by RTI International whose
sole purpose was to propose fraud prevention software tools. While RTI’s suggestions were not
adopted, its clear the ONC believed it had the ability to adopt such recommendations and further,
none of the public comments received in response to the report questioned the ONC’s ability to
adopt the recommendations. RTI International, Recommended Requirements for Enhancing Data
Quality in Electronic Health Records. May 2007, http://www.rti.org/pubs/ehcancing_data_quality
_in_ehrs.pdf. This report will be discussed extensively in Part III of this paper.

9

because not only will they ensure EHRs are not used to increase fraud, but if adequately
designed, they can actively decrease all health care fraud.
A.

POLICY ARGUMENT 1: GIVEN THE TREMENDOUS NEGATIVE IMPACT OF
FRAUD AND ABUSE ON THE HEALTH CARE SYSTEM, A STRONG FEDERAL
RESPONSE IS REQUIRED TO PREVENT FURTHER DAMAGE FROM THE
EXPLOITATION OF EHR SOFTWARE.

Dr. Donald W. Simborg, the chairman of several federal panels that examined the
potential for fraud in electronic health systems, compared fraud and abuse in the health
care system to “doping and bicycling…[e]verybody knows it’s going on.”35

The

statistics concerning the extent of fraud and abuse in the U.S. health care system can only
be described as simply staggering. According to a 2008 study by the Association of
Certified Fraud Examiners, (1) about $133 billion of all payments by CMS were
distributed improperly due to the filing of illegitimate claims, (2) $50 billion in payments
made by Blue Cross and Blue Shield were for fraudulent payments, and (3) $100 billion
in other private or patient payments were for some form of improper billing.36 Based
upon this conservative figure, $283 billion, the amount lost due to fraud and abuse in the
U.S. each year towers over the GDP of Ireland, $218 billion. 37
It is important to emphasize that health care fraud is not a victimless crime. The
pervasiveness of fraud and abuse in the system contributes to the rising cost of health
care, which places increased financial burdens on patients and employers alike.38 For

35

Albeson, supra note 12.
Jeffrey Helton, Avoiding Fraud Risks Associated with EHRs, Health Financial Management
Association, July 2010, http://www.mfrpc.com/Default.aspx?DN=f927c939-4f17-44ae-870ddcbaa978d59c.
37
Trading Economics, Ireland GDP, http://www.tradingeconomics.com/ireland/gdp.
38
In 2006, the National Coalition on Health Care (NCHC) noted that “inappropriate care, waste
and fraud” were major contributors to the rising cost of medical care and health insurance in the
U.S. National Coalition on Health Care (NCHC). Health Insurance Cost: Facts on the Cost of
Health Care. 2007, http://www.nchc.org/facts/costs.html.
36
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patients, this means having to pay higher insurance premiums, which many families are
unable to do during the current economic recession.39 For employers, health care fraud
increases the overall cost of doing business, and in some instances, has resulted in
employers dropping insurance coverage altogether.40 Given this information, it is not
surprising the National Health Care Anti-Fraud Association (NHCAA) has opined “[f]or
many Americans, the increased expense resulting from fraud could mean the difference
between making health insurance a reality or not.”41
While increased health care costs are troublesome, what’s more disconcerting is that
fraud and abuse can directly and adversely affect patient care for those who are already
insured.

42

For example, consider a situation where a diagnostic note is included in a

patient’s EHR solely to justify the use of a higher billing code. At first glance, the
erroneous note appears to have no direct impact on the patient’s health. After all, the
patient has already received care and is presumably on the road to recovery. However, it
is important to remember that the erroneous note will remain in the patient’s EHR and, as
such, could adversely affect future clinical decisions.43

39

Dr. Hirschtick, whose

National Health Care Anti-Fraud Association, The Problem of Health Care Fraud,
http://www.nhcaa.org/resources/health-care-anti-fraud-resources/the-problem-of-health-carefraud.aspx. Unsurprisingly, lack of medical insurance directly impacts the health of patients. A
study by Harvard University linked the lack of insurance to 45,000 death per year in the U.S.
Reed Abelson, Harvard Medical Study Links Lack of Insurance to 45,000 U.S. Death a Year,
N.Y. Times, September 17, 2009, http://prescriptions.blogs.nytimes.com/2009/09/17/harvardmedical-study-links-lack-of-insurance-to-45000-us-deaths-a-year.
40
Id.
41
Id.
42
Unfortunately, there are numerous concrete examples of patients being harmed as a result of
health care fraud and abuse. One of the more egregious cases involves a Chicago cardiologist
that performed over seven hundred and fifty medically unnecessary heart catherizations over a
10-year fraud scheme that resulted in at least two deaths. The physician was eventually sentenced
to federal prison in 2002. Bruce Japsen, Edgewater Doctor’s Sentence is 12 Years, Chicago
Tribune, June 29, 2002, http://articles.chicagotribune.com/2002-06-29/business/020629.
43
In Money and Outpatient Psychiatry: Practice Guidelines from Accounts to Ethics, Cecilia M.
Mikalac contends that the inclusion of a false diagnosis in a patient’s medical record can cause

11

experiences with copying and pasting in EHRs were discussed in Part I, provides
perspective on how easily a physician could be misled by an erroneous note. “The patient
does seem fully coherent now, but the EMR says she’s demented and who are you going
to believe, EMR or a demented patient?...everything in the EMR becomes true.” 44
Patient care can be affected by fraud and abuse in even more subtle ways. For
example, fraud and abuse can decrease the finite health insurance benefits available to
already insured patients. 45 Patients who have private health insurance often have lifetime
caps or other limits on benefits under their policies. Every time a claim is falsely paid in a
patient's name, the dollar amount counts toward that patient's lifetime or other limits.

46

This means that when a patient legitimately needs his or her insurance benefits the most,
they may have already been exhausted. 47
Given the tremendous impact of fraud on the health care system, a strong federal
response is required to prevent further damage from the exploitation of EHR software.
This paper advocates for the strongest conceivable federal response to this burgeoning
problem by calling for amendments to the certifications regulations that will change the
minimum requirements for each and every EHR system in the U.S. It is important to
emphasize that this growing problem should be addressed through federal action since

societal harm as well by distorting the prevalence of certain diseases. She notes, “distorting
diagnoses makes it difficult for governments and insurers to obtain accurate information for
calculating current and future health care costs and skews statistics …about the prevalence of
psychiatric illness.” Cecilia M. Mikalac, Money and Outpatient Psychiatry: Practice Guidelines
from Accounts to Ethics, pg, 58, New York: W.W. Norton, 2005.
44
Dr. Hirschtick, supra note 15.
45
The Affordable Care Act (ACA) eliminates all annual and lifetime limits on health insurance
benefits starting in 2014. See 42 U.S.C.A. § 300gg-11.
46
NCHC, supra note 38.
47
Id.
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health care fraud is truly a national problem.48 This is especially true with respect to
upcoding, which as discussed previously, is one of primary types of fraud that is
increased when EHR software is exploited. In September of 2012, CPI released a report
that found physicians have billed Medicare at progressively higher rates over the past
decade and concluded “a significant portion of the added charges are likely due to
‘upcoding.’”49 CPI’s investigation revealed that the increased upcoding was among
“thousands of doctors, from a broad range of specialties and locales.”50 Consistent with
this assertion, when U.S. counties were ranked by percentage of claims submitted at the
highest billing codes, the report found the 20 most aggressive coding counties were
disbursed among 13 different states.51
The government’s response to this vexing problem must not only be strong, but it
must be immediate as well. According to HHS estimates, the use of EHR systems will
increase dramatically over the next few years. By 2015, 85% of hospitals will use EHR
systems, as opposed to just 35% this year. Further, the use of EHRs by independent
physicians is estimated to increase by approximately 25% within just the next year.

52

The government must seize this opportunity to adequately secure EHR software through
amendments to the certification regulations before the amount of fraud attributable to
EHR software explodes even further.
Senator Chuck Grassley (R-IA), in discussing OIG’s experience with fraud in the Medicaid
program has noted, “it is perfectly clear from [OIG’s] narratives that fraud and abuse in the
Medicaid program is not concentrated in any specific area. Rather, it is widespread throughout the
entire program.” U.S. Senate Committee on Finance, Grassley Urges More Attention to Medicaid
Fraud, August 18, 2004, http://www.finance.senate.gov/newsroom/chairman/release/?id
=d0ca4434-add2-4213-92d9-9592925e931b.
49
Schulte, supra note 27.
50
Id.
51
Id.
52
HHS, Physicians Using EHR Technology, Express Positive Reviews, July 17, 2012,
http://www.hhs.gov/news/press/2012pres/07/20120717a.html.
48
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B.

POLICY ARGUMENT 2: THE RESPONSIVE TACTICS CURRENTLY
EMPHASIZED BY THE GOVERNMENT ARE OF LIMITED EFFECTIVENESS IN
COMBATING HEALTH CARE FRAUD, AND AS SUCH, THE FEDERAL
GOVERNMENT MUST PLACE MORE EMPHASIZE ON PROACTIVE
TACTICS, SUCH AS EHR FRAUD PREVENTION SOFTWARE TOOLS, TO
CURB THE EXPLOITATION OF EHR SOFTWARE.

Cesare Beccaria53 once famously wrote, “it is better to prevent crimes than to
punish them. This is the fundamental principle of good legislation.”54 The reasoning
behind Beccaria’s statement is quite obvious and inherently logical.

It is always

preferable to avoid the negative consequences of bad behavior, if possible, than to hope
to effectively deal with them after the fact.55 Curiously, the federal government has
largely ignored preventative measures in its fight against health care fraud, even though,
it has relied heavily upon them to avoid other great harms to the country.56 Given the
undeniable failure of the government’s responsive tactics in fighting health care fraud,
and upcoding in particular, the federal government must shift its focus towards more
proactive measures, such as fraud prevention software tools, to curb the exploitation of
EHR systems.

53
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devastating consequences of terrorism after the fact. Likewise, in recognition of the tremendous
harm caused by health care fraud, the government must place more emphasis on preventative
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Historically, the U.S. government has emphasized responsive approaches, such as
post payment data-analysis, to identify fraud after the fact, and aggressive litigation to
deter other dishonest health care providers from committing fraud.57 The government’s
responsive tactics have proven to be of limited effectiveness. Studies indicate that only a
tiny portion of health care fraud is identified through responsive tactics. A report
prepared by the American Health Information Management Association (AHIMA)
estimated that only three to ten percent of healthcare fraud is ever identified.58 William J.
Rudman, PhD, a co-author of the AHIMA report, asserted, “we are probably only at the
tip of the iceberg in terms of being able to identify…fraud.”59 Further, it takes years to
discover the small portion of fraud that is actually uncovered through responsive tactics.
Dr. Rudman noted that instances of fraud that are detected “only surface after years of
aberrant data patterns raise a red flag.”
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It can take years to identify fraud through

responsive tactics even when a medical institution reviews its own records. According
to Dr. Rudman, “in big corporations, it may take four or five years to document cases of
fraud.”61
When the government identifies fraud, severe financial penalties are typically
levied against those who have abused the system.
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note 7.
58
Foundation of Research and Education of AHIMA. A Study of Health Care Fraud and Abuse:
Implications for Professionals Managing Health Information. Nov, 2010. Page 2.
http://ahimafoundation.org/downloads/pdfs/Fraud%20and%20Abuse%20-%20final%2011-410.pdf.
59
Eramo, supra note 7.
60
Id.
61
Id.
62
A Department of Justice (DOJ) news release indicates the government obtained over $3 billion
dollars in judgments and settlements in health care fraud and abuse cases in 2011. United States
57

15

the large amounts that have been recovered through fraud and abuse litigation,63 however,
the amounts recovered pale in comparison to the financial damage done to the system.
According to a Department of Justice (DOJ) press release, the federal government
recovered $3 billion dollars in 2011 from judgments and settlements resulting from health
care fraud investigations.64 While this figure is impressive in isolation, consider that $5
billion is stolen from the system as a result of health care fraud every week. 65
While responsive tactics are generally ineffective in fighting all types of health
care fraud, as the above figures demonstrate, they have proven particularly inept at
counteracting upcoding and billing for services not rendered. Of the $3 billion recovered
by the DOJ in 2011, the vast majority, $2.2 billion, came from improvident
pharmaceutical companies.66 Therefore, comparatively little was recovered from health
care professionals that commit health care fraud through upcoding and billing for services
not rendered.67 What’s more, studies suggests that the small amount recovered from
upcoding physicians each year is almost entirely attributable to whistleblowers coming
forward rather than the federal government’s responsive investigative techniques. PCI’s
DOJ, Justice Department Recovers $3 Billion in False Claims Act Cases in Fiscal Year 2011,
December 19, 2011, http://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/2011/December/11-civ-1665.html (hereafter
“DOJ press release.”)
63
There are no shortage of the examples of the government publicizing its large fraud and abuse
monetary recoveries. The latest and most notable example came during the first Presidential
debate of 2012 when President Obama proudly proclaimed, “we went after medical fraud in
Medicare and Medicaid very aggressively, more aggressively than ever before, and have saved
tens of billions of dollars, $50 billion of waste taken out of the system.” Presidential Debate
Questions and Transcript (October 3, 2012), http://www.politico.com/news/stories/1012/81991_
_Page4.html#ixzz29qJmqHrw.
64
DOJ press release, supra note 62.
65
It is estimated health care fraud results in $283 billion lost each year. This number, $283
billion, divided by the amount of weeks in a year, 52, results in an average of $5.4 billion stolen
each week as a result of health care fraud. Helton, supra note 36.
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DOJ press release, supra note 62.
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This is significant since health care professionals commit 72% of all health care fraud. Thomas
D. Musco, et. al., Health Insurers’ Anti-Fraud Programs, Health Insurance Association of
America, 1999, http://www.claim.org/workshops_separate/00FC07.pdf.
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September 2012 report, discussed above, specifically asserted the government “typically
has no way of find out [about persistent upcoding] unless someone on the inside comes
forward and alerts them.”

68

If responsive tactics cannot effectively curb upcoding and

billing for services not rendered in general, there is absolutely no reason to believe such
tactics will address the increased instances of these types of fraud that will result from the
exploitation of EHR software.
C.

POLICY ARGUMENT 3: DATA MINING, THE PRIMARY PROACTIVE
APPROACH BEING UTILIZED BY THE GOVERNMENT, CANNOT
SIGNIFICANTLY SLOW FRAUD AND ABUSE BY ITSELF, AND THEREFORE,
OTHER PROACTIVE APPROACHES MUST BE IMPLEMENTED.

Over the past few years, fraud prevention, as opposed to paying and chasing, has
gained some traction in the federal government.69 Undoubtedly, data mining is the center
piece of the government’s initial shift toward more proactive fraud tactics. 70 Data mining
is a pattern discovery process that relies upon large volumes of data to infer meaningful
patterns and relationships between data items.71 Roughly stated, the purpose of data
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Robert Radick, a Forbes Magazine contributor, has noted that the use of data mining has
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2012,
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government passed regulations that allow State Medicaid Fraud Control Units (MCFUs) to seek
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mining is to extract useful information from data using complex algorithms.72 In the
health care context, the goal of data mining is to significantly decrease health care fraud
by uncovering fraudulent billing practices. However, there are several factors that suggest
the government is unlikely to obtain far reaching success with data mining as its sole
proactive approach.73
First, as a preliminary matter, it is important to note that data mining is a relatively
new developed methodology and technology, coming into prominence only in 1994.74 As
such, some suggest there is a lack of published well-researched methods and algorithms
in any context, let alone the complex health care environment, for this approach to be
successful over the long term.75 Even if the most beneficial algorithms are currently in
place, the government is not guaranteed long-term success with this approach since any
data mining initiative must continually adapt to changing circumstances to remain
successful. 76 As time goes by, fraudsters will change their behaviors in response to the
current algorithms.77 Tom Fawcett, a respected data mining scholar, has noted “[w]ithin
the near future after uncovering the current modus operandi of professional fraudsters,
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these same fraudsters will continually supply new or modified styles of fraud until the
detection systems start generating false negatives again.” 78
Even assuming the government adequately deals with this issue, there are still serious
doubts as to whether there is reliable medical data to analyze. Medicaid claims data in
particular has come under intense scrutiny, and high-ranking governmental officials have
recognized the unreliability of such data. For example, in June of this year, HHS
Regional Inspector General Ann Maxwell recently acknowledged to the House
Committee on Oversight and Government Reform that much of the Medicaid data that is
mined and analyzed to identify overpayments and fraud is not “current, available,
complete, [or] accurate.”

79

Regional Inspector General Maxwell concluded, “[t]he poor

quality of the Medicaid data…hindered their ability to efficiently detect suspicious trends
in Medicaid claims for further auditing or investigation.” 80
The initial data suggests that data mining is not having as significant of an impact as
originally hoped. In 2011, federal regulations were passed that permit State Medicaid
Fraud Control Units (MCFUs) to seek federal funds to start data mining.81 Florida’s
MCFU was the first state entity to obtain federal funding.82 In its first 8 months of
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utilizing data mining technology, the state’s efforts only resulted in 2 court cases and 18
complaints opened. 83
Perhaps it is too early to pass judgment on Florida’s efforts, but even in more
established data mining programs, the results are far from over whelming. For example,
consider the Medicare-Medicaid Data Match Program (frequently referred to as the
“Medi-Medi Project.”) The Medi-Medi project combines Medicare and Medicaid claims
and then utilizes computer algorithms to search for payment anomalies.84 The program
started in 2001 in California, and has slowly expanded to other portions of the country. 85
In 2007, when the program was in operation in 10 states, the Chief Financial Officer of
CMS at the time, Timothy B. Hill, asserted, “to date…$15 million in overpayments have
been referred for collection, and $25 million in improper payments have been denied
before payment was made.”86 The paltry amounts recovered, in comparison to the billion
stolen each year, suggest the federal government should utilize a more diversified
approach that includes different types of proactive tactics, such as fraud prevention
software tools, in order to address the increase of fraud through exploitation of EHR
systems.
D.

POLICY ARGUMENT 4: FRAUD PREVENTION SOFTWARE TOOLS SHOULD
BE REQUIRED IN ALL EHRS BECAUSE THEY CAN NOT ONLY ADDRESS
THE PROBLEM OF INCREASED FRAUD DUE TO ABUSE OF EHR TOOLS,
THEY CAN DECREASE ALL HEALTH CARE FRAUD.
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Health care fraud is not a homogenous crime. It is committed by a number of
different perpetrators whom utilize varied fraudulent schemes.87 Therefore, admittedly,
the problem is unlikely to be completely eliminated by any singular proactive approach.
However, fraud prevention software tools could become the strongest tool in combating
health care fraud because they can not only prevent abuse of EHR tools, but, if properly
designed, they can also help decrease all instances of health care fraud.
Studies indicate health care professionals commit the majority of health care fraud,
72%,88 and that this fraud is most commonly perpetrated through either upcoding or
billing for services not rendered.89 As noted in Part I, EHR software includes several
timesaving tools that increase the speed and ease of committing these specific types of
fraud. Fraud prevention tools could be designed to make sure these tools are not abused.
However, there is no reason why fraud tools have to be limited to ensuring EHR features
do not increase the problem of upcoding and billing for services not rendered in the
electronic setting. If properly designed, EHR software could help eliminate these
problems altogether.
A simple example helps demonstrate this point. To address the problem of billing
for services not rendered, EHRs could require advanced identity authentication at the
point of care, such as a biometric thumbprint scan, to ensure a medical examination has
actually taken place. 90 This requirement would ensure that EHR tools, such as one-click
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notes, cannot be used to help create a false record that can then be used to bill for services
not rendered. However, this requirement would not only ensure that EHR software tools
are not abused, it would also actively decrease all instances of this type of fraud. If a
unique thumbprint is required, health care professionals cannot create a record for a visit
out of thin air regardless of whether they would have used EHR software tools to increase
the speed and ease of doing so. As the above example demonstrates, EHR software is
sufficiently malleable to transform it from a tool that increases fraud to a tool that
actively deters it.

III. FRAUD PREVENTION SOFTWARE TOOL RECOMMENDATIONS
In 2007, RTI International published a report entitled Recommended
Requirements for Enhancing Data Quality in Electronic Health Records.

91

The report’s

primary focus was to identify requirements for EHR systems that would “prevent fraud
from occurring, as well as detect fraud both prospectively and retrospectively.”92 The
report set forth fourteen distinct functional requirements.93 While the ONC commissioned
the report, its functional requirements were framed as non-binding “recommendations to
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the industry”94 and subsequently ignored when the certification regulations were
passed.95
Fraud prevention tools hold tremendous promise and should be required in all
EHR systems. However, these tools must be designed with an eye towards the risks
associated with EHR systems if they are going to be effective. As noted, the abuse of
EHR software leads to increased instances of upcoding and billing for services not
rendered. Therefore, the certifications regulations must include several tools that are
specifically designed to prevent these types of fraud. However, the regulations must also
consider the effect each tool will have on the delivery of care because, while fraud is a
tremendous problem, the majority of physicians do not commit health care fraud. 96 The
certification regulations must strike a delicate balance. The government did not
encourage the adoption of EHR’s for its own sake, but rather with hopes of promoting a
system that is more efficient in all facets, including the delivery of care.97 Therefore,
fraud prevention tools must be specifically designed to prevent fraud without stripping
EHR systems of the timesaving capabilities that made them appealing in the first place.
Below, this paper recommends three fraud prevention tools that were initially
advocated by RTI in its 2007 report. The first two recommendations, the regulation of
message prompts and use of biometric identification, are specifically designed to prevent
upcoding and billing for services not rendered. The third recommendation, which
increases the auditing capability of payers, is designed to prevent the payment of
94
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fraudulent claims should other fraud prevention tools not prevent the creation of a false
record. Although these recommendations vary greatly in their approach, they all have the
benefit of not impeding the timesaving tools that make EHR software beneficial to the
majority of physicians who do not abuse the system. The certification regulations should
be immediately amended so that these fraud prevention tools are required in all EHR
systems.
A. RECOMMENDATION 1: THE CERTIFICATION REGULATIONS SHOULD REQUIRE
ALL EHRS HAVE MESSAGE PROMPTS THAT: (1) ADVISE A PHYSICIAN IF THE
SELECTED BILLING CODE IS INCONSISTENT WITH THE ENCOUNTER NOTE
DOCUMENTATION, AND (2) DO NOT SUGGEST WHAT ADDITIONAL
DOCUMENTATION IS REQUIRED TO UTILIZE A HIGHER BILLING CODE.
RTI’s fifth functional requirement addressed message prompts in EHR software. RTI
recommended that all EHR systems should prompt a physician when the billing code
entered is inconsistent with the documentation in the encounter notes.98 Further, RTI
recommended that EHR software not suggest what documentation is required to reach a
higher billing code.99 These interrelated requirements should be included in the
regulations because they address the problem of upcoding head on.
Some studies suggest upcoding accounts for nearly half of all health care fraud, 100
and as previously discussed, the exploitation of EHR software tools leads to an increase
in this type of fraud. As such, the certifications regulations must include fraud prevention
tools that curb this activity. Each part of this recommendation aggressively addresses the
problem of upcoding.

First, explicitly advising physicians when a billing code is

inconsistent with note documentation prevents upcoding by simultaneously deterring
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fraudsters101 intending to upcode and educating honest physicians on proper billing
practices to avoid unintentional upcoding. The prompt serves as a strong deterrent
because fraudsters are immediately be put on notice that their billing practices are
questionable and likely to alert the attention of the authorities. Further, all physicians
would attain a tremendous educational benefit from the prompts because it would provide
physicians with immediate feedback concerning their coding practices.102
Second, message prompts should not suggest how to reach higher billing codes to
ensure that EHR software does not actively entice upcoding.103 Going forward, the
certification regulations must be developed with an eye towards the fact that software
developers have a strong incentive to include tools that make it exceedingly easy to
upcode.104 In order to prosper, software developers must demonstrate to physicians that
their products will result in a return on investment. To do so, software companies have
pitched physicians on the ability of their products to increase income through the use of

101
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higher codes.105 Ross Kopel, a sociology professor at the University of Pennsylvania,
observed that EHR software sales agents stress how the machines help doctors document
the work they do, but “everybody knows there is a wink, wink behind that [with an
underlying understanding that software] will help … make the patient’s visit look more
involved than it is…[and] generate additional revenue.”106 In recognition of the strong
financial incentive software developers have to develop easily abused software, it is
imperative that the certification regulations prohibit tools, such as higher billing code
prompts, that entice physicians to upcode.
B. RECOMMENDATION 2: THE CERTIFICATION REGULATIONS SHOULD REQUIRE
ADVANCED PATIENT IDENTITY AUTHENTICATION AT THE POINT OF CARE
BEFORE PERMITTING A PHYSICIAN TO ENTER AN EXAMINATION NOTE.
Regulating EHR message prompts, in the ways discussed above, would create a
strong deterrent to upcoding. To adequately address the other primary type of fraud
increased through the exploitation of EHRs, billing for services not rendered, the
certification regulations must place a heavy burden on providers to demonstrate a medical
encounter has actually occurred. This can be accomplished by requiring that EHR
systems identify patients through the use of a biometric thumb scan at the point of care.107
In order to prevent all billing for services not rendered, EHR software should do
more than simply record that a patient’s identity has been verified, as was suggested by
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RTI in its report. 108 Instead, the software should go further and require advanced identity
authentication before allowing the physician to take any action, such as enter an
examination note. By requiring identity authentication first, all instances of billing for
services not rendered would be decreased, as explained in Part II.D, and importantly,
none of the EHR time-savings tools would be impaired. As noted above, it is important
that the certification regulations adopt requirements that can combat fraud, and at the
same time, do not hinder the tools that make the provision of care more efficient through
use of EHRs. This requirement does not hamper any of the EHRs timesaving tools, and
could actually make the entire physician office experience more efficient. As explained
by Ken Congdon:109

After an initial scan, the identifying characteristics in the scan can be linked to the
patient's record. In every subsequent visit, the patient will no longer have to go
through the lengthy registration process (i.e. filling out paper work, submitting an
insurance card, etc.). Instead, all of this data can be automatically populated based
on the stored information linked to the biometric scan.110
In addition to curbing billing for services not rendered, this requirement would
also help eliminate medical identity theft, one of the fastest growing types of health care
fraud.111 Medical identity theft most commonly occurs when a person uses someone

RTI’s eleventh functional requirement, patient-identity proofing, suggested EHRs systems be
able to “document/record that identity-proofing was completed and the method used to verify.”
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else’s medical record to obtain medical goods or services.112 In 2010, 1.42 million
Americans were the victims of medical identity theft. 113 In addition to defrauding payers,
medical identity theft can adversely affect patient care. “When a victim’s records are
merged with a thief using the same identity… that record becomes ‘polluted,’ and the
victim may be…misdiagnosed based on this inaccurate information.”114 According to a
2011 report conducted by the Ponemon Institute, 15% of medical identity theft ultimately
results in either mistreatment or misdiagnosis of illness.115
While there is little doubt that biometric identification can be a powerful fraud
prevention tool, the use of biometrics raises privacy concerns for many.116 Privacy
advocates express particular concern over the consequences that could result from the
unauthorized distribution of such sensitive information. Chris Dunn, associate legal
director at the New York Civil Liberties Union, has opined “anytime you surrender
private information like DNA, fingerprints, iris scans or palm prints, you need to
understand that the information can be stored in a database, distributed to the world and
used in ways you never intended.”117 However, those in the biometrics industry contend
such views are misguided and the product of media depictions of biometrics that “do not
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accurately depict biometric technology, and leave [viewers] with ill conceived
perceptions about the technology actually works.”118
A review of how biometric technology identifies patients confirms that privacy
concerns are largely unwarranted.119 When a patient’s thumb is initially scanned by a
biometric device, the patient’s biometric data is instantly converted into an otherwise
unrelated data-string.120

It is this data-string, and not an image of the patient’s

thumbprint, that is retained and used to verify the patient’s identity. In fact, since the
patient’s thumbprint is instantly converted, a physical image of the patient’s fingerprint is
never stored or transmitted across a network. 121 Furthermore, “it is nearly impossible to
reverse engineer the [data-string] and successfully ‘steal’ [or re-create a patient’s]
biometric identity.” 122 Even assuming the data string could be reversed engineered to recreate an image of the patient’s thumbprint, the image would most likely be useless to a
potential identity thief since most biometric systems do not associates data-strings with
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patient names.123 As the above discussion makes clear, biometric technology has
advanced to a point where the chance of unauthorized distribution of biometric data has
been all but eliminated. As such, privacy concerns should not prevent the implementation
of biometric identification in all EHR systems.
C. RECOMMENDATION 3: THE CERTIFICATION REGULATIONS SHOULD PERMIT
PAYERS TO HAVE READ-ONLY ACCESS TO A PATIENT’S ENTIRE EPISODE OF
CARE.
RTI’s eighth functional requirement addressed the auditing capabilities of EHRs.124
RTI recommended that EHR systems allow payers read-only access to a patient’s entire
episode of care, as opposed to only each individual visit.125 This recommendation should
be included in the certification regulations because it will increase the information
available to payers, and therefore, increase their ability to detect fraud as soon as possible
after payment is made or, ideally, before payment is made.
Payers need adequate information in order to detect fraud. In its report, RTI noted
that it is exceedingly difficult to detect fraud before payment is made due to the scant
amount of information typically available to payers. “Detection of a fraudulent claim is
often difficult when a payer has access only to EHR information for a single
encounter.”126 As RTI notes, it is quite logical that “[r]eviewing information over an
entire episode of care for a single patient [would result in] greater ability to detect
fraud.”127 In recognition of the tremendous amount of damage being done by health care

“9.9 times out of 10 biometric systems do not associate names with a biometric template so
how would the criminal/hacker know who’s biometric information it actually is?” Carter, supra
note 119.
123

124

RTI International, supra note 13 at 4-12.
Id.
126
Id.
127
Id.
125

30

fraud, the regulations must allow for those in the best position to prevent fraud to have
ample information to detect it.
While the hope is that software fraud tools will prevent the exploitation of EHR
software tools, it will be admittedly difficult to craft tools to combat every single way the
software can exploited. This requirement recognizes this fact and adds another layer of
protection by giving payers a real chance to prevent fraudulent payments, and the many
harms that flow there from. Beyond preventing payment of fraudulent claims, this
requirement has the added benefit of not impeding delivery of care. The goal is to
implement software protections that combat fraud without negatively impacting the
majority of care that is unaffected by health care fraud. This requirement undoubtedly
furthers this goal.
While this requirement has obvious advantages, it was controversial to privacy
advocates.128 Deborah Peel, head of the Patient Privacy Rights Foundation, when asked
about this requirement opined, “[it] proposes to violate every American’s health privacy
to detect health care fraud.” 129 The privacy concerns associated with this requirement are
overstated and should not prevent its inclusion in the certification regulations.
There is no doubt that privacy is an issue that is important to many patients, 130 and
should be an important consideration in shaping EHR fraud prevention tools. This
requirement represents a measured approach that respects patient privacy. First, it must
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be emphasized that this requirement only grants payers access to information they have
already viewed. By allowing payers access to an entire episode of care, the payer is in
reality simply reviewing prior related bills for consistency. As such, this requirement
makes it quicker and easier for the payer to detect fraud, yet, does not require patients to
reveal new additional information in the process.
Further, this requirement represents a truly measured approach in that it limits
payer access to identifiable episodes of care, and therefore, specifically excludes access
to the patient’s entire EHR. In many instances, payers will receive the same exact
information that they normally would. For example, if the patient’s current visit is
unrelated to any prior medical issues or visits, such as a visit related to the seasonal flu,
that singular visit constitutes the entire episode of care and, as such, the payer only
receives information pertaining to that visit. This requirement does not attempt to “violate
every American’s health privacy” as Ms. Peel suggests. It simply asks patients to give up
just a slither of privacy to help protect a system on the brink. The benefits of this
requirement fair outweigh any privacy concerns and, as such, should be included in the
certification regulations.

IV. CRITICISMS TO FRAUD PREVENTION SOFTWARE TOOLS
Although RTI’s specific software tool recommendations were not adopted, the
public comments to their report indicated strong public support for the proposal of
fighting fraud by securing EHR software.131 Those critical of RTI’s report primarily
focused upon concerns that arose from RTI’s specific recommendations, and not the
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the public comments period supported each recommendation made by RTI. Id.
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general approach of fraud prevention software tools.132 That being said, it is likely that
the federal government and civil liberty groups will oppose the use of fraud software
tools, albeit for very different reasons.
It is foreseeable that some in the Obama Administration will oppose fighting
fraud through the use of software tools for fear of physician backlash. By all accounts,
RTI’s 2007 proposal was “totally ignored for fear of a physician backlash.”133 Dr. Robert
Kolodner, a physician who headed the federal push for EHRs in 2007, acknowledged that
fraud prevention took a backseat to steps likely to entice the medical community to
embrace the new technology.134
The possibility of physician backlash is no longer a viable reason for the federal
government to delay implementation of aggressive fraud prevention tools in EHRs. While
enticing physicians to adopt EHR software is a laudable goal, it must be remembered that
EHR adoption is not the ultimate goal.135 If the amount of fraud in the system explodes
due to use of EHR software, the desired goals of EHR adoption, mainly a more efficient
and cost-effective health care system, may never be realized. Further, the government has
already put in place policies that should sufficiently entice EHR adoption. Under the
American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009 (Recovery Act), physicians can
receive significant financial payments if they display meaningful use of EHRs.
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the government will start penalizing those that do not utilize EHRs. 137 The excuses of the
past must be abandoned so that the full benefits of EHRs can be realized.
In addition to opposition from the government, it also likely fraud prevention
tools will arise concerns in civil liberties advocates. Fraud software tools represent an
aggressive preventative approach to combating the exploitation of EHR systems. In
recent years, there has been a public outcry against overly aggressive preventative
policing measures. Specifically, there have been a number of demonstrations protesting
what have been dubbed “preemptive law enforcement measures,” wherein the
government uses available information to predict who will commit certain offenses and
then aggressively intervenes to prevent the commission of a crime.138 A commonly used,
and often criticized, preemptive law enforcement measure is “stop and frisk” which
essentially permits law enforcement officers to detain and search anyone they consider
suspicious.139 Advocates argue “preemptive law enforcement [is] not only an oxymoron,
but…[it] violates a number of civil rights.”140 Such measures are usually opposed on the
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grounds they violate the Fourth Amendment’s guarantee of freedom from unreasonable
searches and seizures.141
Preemptive law enforcement critics raise valid concerns, however, these concerns
should not prevent adoption of the proposal set forth in this paper since fraud prevention
software tools do not represent a truly preemptive law enforcement measure. Preemptive
law enforcement involves measures, such as “stop and frisk,” that involve either the
detainment of an individual, or at the very least, some sort of actual police intervention,
including surveillance, prior to the commission of a crime. Fraud prevention tools, in
contrast, simply add protections to EHRs so they are not used to commit illegal ends.
Fraud software tools do not involve police intervention or surveillance, quite to the
contrary, these measures seek to remove the need of law enforcement by making it
impossible to misuse EHR software tools. As such, fraud prevention tools raise no
constitutional concerns. Since, as the above discussion demonstrates, the concerns
associated with fraud prevention software are largely unwarranted, the certification
regulations should be amended to mandate their inclusion in all EHR systems.

CONCLUSION
The federal government has taken bold steps to ensure that EHRs are a focal part
of the U.S. health care system. EHRs promise better patient care, increased efficiency,
and reduced health care costs. In short, EHRs may hold the key to a brighter future for
U.S. health care. However, the same features of EHRs that engender hope, also cast a
dark ominous shadow on the future. EHR software tools increase the speed of health care
delivery, yet also provide dishonest health care professionals with almost endless
141
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opportunities to game the system and increase the widespread damage caused by health
care fraud.
To protect the future of the U.S. health care system, the federal government must
amend the certification regulations to mandate the inclusion of fraud prevention tools in
EHR software. Fraud prevention tools will not only ensure that EHRs do not increase the
amount of fraud in the system, but if designed properly, they can significantly eliminate
all instances of health care fraud. The fraud tools should strive to address upcoding and
billing for services not rendered, which account for the vast majority of health care fraud,
and are the types of fraud most likely to increase through the exploitation of EHR
systems. Requiring identity authentication at the point of care and putting strong controls
on message prompts, recommended in Part III of this paper, would go along way in
preventing these problems. Conversely, permitting payers read only access to a patient’s
entire episode of care would go along way in detecting these problems if dishonest health
care professionals somehow find a wrinkle in the system. With immediate and
appropriate action, the future with EHRs is still bright.
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